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OBSCENITY AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWSt
FREDERICK
I.

F. ScHAUER*

INTRODUCTION

Of all the obscenity cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the last twenty years,' none has had the import-

ance, both in the public eye and in the development of obscenity
law, as has Miller v. California.' Miller is significant for many
reasons,3 but none so much as its approval of the concept of local
community standards as the guideline by which the obscenity vel

non of a given work is to be measured.' With this change, however,
came the introduction of a new factor in obscenity law-the ques-

tion of which local community's standard is to be applied in a
given case. If a defendant is charged in a criminal prosecution with

distributing obscene materials from New York to Connecticut and
Rhode Island, which community is relevant in defining contemporary community standards? Does the answer depend on whether
t Copyright

©

Frederick F. Schauer 1975.
* Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law; A.B.,
1967 and M.B.A., 1968, Dartmouth College; J.D., 1972, Harvard University.
I Since Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court has handed down
full opinions in over thirty obscenity cases (almost all of which have involved
several concurring and dissenting opinions), and has decided innumerable cases by
per curiam opinions or other forms of summary disposition. Probably no substantive area other than criminal procedure has received as much attention from the
Court.
2 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
For more comprehensive analyses of Miller and its companion cases, see
Fahringer & Brown, Rise and Fall of Roth-A Critique of the Recent Supreme
Court Obscenity Decisions, 10 Cami. L. BuLL. 785 (1974); Hunsaker, 1973 Obscenity
-Pornography Decisions:Analysis, Impact, and Legislative Alternatives, 11 SAN.
DiGO L. REV. 906 (1974); Clor, Obscenity and the FirstAmendment: Round Three,
7 LOYOLA U.L. REV. (L.A.) 207 (1974); Leventhal, 1973 Round of ObscenityPornographyDecisions, 59 A.B.A.J. 1261 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1972 Term,
87 HARV. L. REV. 57, 160 (1973); 18 ST. Louis U.L.J. 297 (1973); 49 IND. L.J. 320
(1974); 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 442 (1973).
413 U.S. at 30-34.
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the prosecution is in New York, Connecticut, or Rhode Island? Or
suppose a defendant is charged with transporting obscene material
from Florida to North Carolina, during which the material passes
through Georgia and South Carolina. If tried in South Carolina,
what standards should be used? If the standards of a community
other than the forum are to be used, how are those standards to
be proved? Similar questions may arise where only a single state
is involved in the transaction, depending upon whether the community is defined as a city, a county, or a judicial district.
The proposed situations are by no means hypothetical. Most
obscenity cases in fact involve issues of this type, since the production and distribution of motion pictures, books, and magazines
involve, in virtually every instance, a number of different geographic areas. Even so, there has yet to be a reasoned judicial
discussion of this issue in any of the reported cases. The choice of
law decision is generally made without a full realization that there
are major choice of law problems in this area involving both traditional conflict of laws issues and significant constitutional considerations. This is due, in part, to the fact that most obscenity cases
arise in the context of criminal prosecutions,5 an area in which
choice of law has rarely been an issue. Yet the dynamics of an
obscenity case, in light of the local standards concept, are such as
to make the conflict of laws issues much more important than in
any other type of criminal case. The purpose of this article is to
point out the choice of law problems that arise in obscenity litigation, to analyze the competing considerations in making the choice
of law decision, and to suggest an analytical framework for making
reasoned decisions in this area.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

LOCAL STANDARDS CONCEPT

The determination of whether or not a work is obscene must
be measured in the context of "contemporary community standards." This aspect of the test for obscenity can be traced to Roth
v. United States,6 the first Supreme Court case to deal fully with
the permissible scope of obscenity regulation.' In Roth, the Court
I While not the exclusive method of obscenity regulation, criminal prosecution
is by far the most common. There are, however, civil proceedings involving seizures,
licensing, injunctions, and declaratory judgements. See notes 102-04 infra.
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1 Roth was by no means, however, the Supreme Court's first obscenity case. A
number of earlier cases had dealt with obscenity, but none discussed in depth the
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declared the test for obscenity to be "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."8 Although this was the first use by the Supreme Court of the
term "contemporary community standards" the concept of contemporary community standards, as well as all of the other elements of the Roth test, was only a restatement of the test used by
a number of lower courts prior to Roth.' While none of these lower
court opinions explicitly used the phrase "contemporary community standards," each placed considerable emphasis on the concept that prevailing views of morality and decency change with
time and that what is obscene at one time and place may not be
obscene at another.10 Thus, the concept of contemporary community standards as an element of obscenity litigation was hardly
new at the time Roth was decided, although it was not until Roth
that it received the sanction of the United States Supreme Court.
The purpose of the "contemporary community standards"
aspect of the Roth test is to insure that the finder of fact apply
some external standard, rather than his or her personal views of
morality of decency, when resolving the question of obscenity in a
particular case. It was also intended to prevent a determination of
obscenity on the basis of an adverse effect on a "particularly susceptible" subclass of the community." Yet there was no discussion
in Roth of how community was to be defined, and the Court does
relationship of obscenity regulation to first amendment restrictions. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (prior restraint); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (statute unconstitutionally vague); Mutual Film Corp.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915) (Ohio censorship act upheld); Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446 (1896) (libelous newspaper article not within
scope of federal obscenity statute); Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896)
(indictment need not contain exact obscene matter; defendant need not have actual
knowledge as to obscenity); Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (federal obscenity
statute upheld).
'354 U.S. at 489.
The concept seems first to have been enuniciated by Learned Hand, then a
Federal District Judge, in United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y.
1913). See also Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E.2d 840 (1945);
State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 272 S.W.2d 283 (1954); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Melko, 25 N.J. Super, 292, 96 A.2d 47 (1953).
11Although the word "community" was frequently used in earlier cases, the
emphasis of the concept was that standards change over time. See, e.g.; Parmelee
v. United States, 113 F.2d 729, 731 (D.C. Cir. 1940). The shift in focus to the idea
of geographic variations is of more recent origin.
" 354 U.S. at 488-89.
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not seem to have considered the issue.'2
The Supreme Court first faced the issue of the geographic
contours of the community in Manual Enterprises v. Day,'3 an
appeal from a ruling barring certain magazines from the mails
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1461. Justice Harlan, who announced the
judgment of the Court and wrote an opinion in which Justice Stewart joined, declared that a "national standard of decency" was
appropriate in this federal action, since the federal statute reached
the entire United States."4 While a state might set its own standards, and while Congress might set a more local geographic standard, the relevant community for a federal prosecution, absent
state15 or congressional specification, was held to be the entire country.

Two years later, the Court was faced with this issue in the
context of a state obscenity prosecution. In Jacobellis v. Ohio,"
Justice Brennan stated that Roth did not in any way mandate that
a standard be drawn from the local community. Emphasizing that
"it is, after all, a national constitution we are expounding," Justice
Brennan stated that the scope of constitutional protection must be
uniform throughout the country.' 7 To hold otherwise, he reasoned,
would have a deterrent effect on the total distribution of material
that might be considered offensive in only a small part of the
country, since no distributor would take the risk of the varying
adjudications that would result from a variable standard.'" Justice
12 The best discussion of this aspect of Roth is found in Lockhart & McClure,
Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L.
Rov. 5, 49-50 (1960). At least two federal courts adopted a local standard after Roth.
United States v. West Coast News Co., 30 F.R.D. 13 (W.D. Mich. 1962), aff 'd, 357
F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds per curium sub noma., Aday v.
United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967). United States v. Frew, 187 F. Supp. 500, 506
(E.D. Mich. 1960).
IS 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
" Id. at 488.
IsThe opinion left open the question of whether Congress could constitutionally prescribe a more local standard. Id. Although Congress never attempted to take
such action, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), seems to allow such
action.
, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).

,7Id. at 193-95.
25

Id. at 194. See Comment, Multi-Venue and the Obscenity Statutes, 115 U.

PA. L. Rav. 399, 425 (1967).

This argument, however, addresses itself only to the effect of a community with
stricter than average standards and not to the effect on a community with standards more permissive than the national norm. As has subsequently been noted in
Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973), a national standard has the effect
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Brennan's views on the necessity of a national standard, even in
state cases, did not command a majority of the Court; only Justice
Goldberg joined in his opinion. Justice White concurred without
opinion, and the concurring opinions of Justices Stewart, Black,
19
and Douglas did not discuss the issue of community standards.
Chief Justice Warren, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Clark, disagreed with the national standards test, chiefly because
he felt that there was, and could be, no one national standard."
In a separate dissenting opinion Justice Harlan reiterated his position that a national standard should apply to federal statutes and
a more local standard to state obscenity regulation. 21 Thus, regarding the issue of the geographical contours of the community from
which a standard of obscenity is to be drawn, those Justices who
expressed an opinion in Jacobellis were evenly divided, excluding
Justice Harlan's variable standard, as to whether the community
should be local or national in scope. The national standards view
was not accepted by a majority of the Court in either Jacobellis or
any other case. Despite this, the overwhelming majority of lower
courts that faced the problem after Jacobellisemployed a national
definition of contemporary community standards. 22 While some of
of prohibiting the distribution of material in a permissive community that that
community is willing to accept.
As a question of logic, the two dangers are probably of equal significance. In
practice, however, they may not be equivalent. The danger of the "chilling effect"
of local standards is fairly obvious. The danger of keeping materials from a more
permissive community, as theoretically could happen with a national standard,
may be illusory, since the material is unlikely to be prosecuted in that community,
or the community itself may, by statute, relax its regulation of obscenity.

378 U.S. at 196-97.
Id. at 199-203.

Id. at 203-04.
Every federal court that faced the issue after Jacobellis selected a national
standard. Chemline, Inc. v. Grand Prairie, 364 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Davis, 353 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 953 (1966);
Haldeman v. United States, 340 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1965); United States v. West
Coast News Co., 357 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd on othergroundssub nom. Aday
v. United States, 388 U.S. 447 (1967); United States v. Ginzburg; 338 F.2d 12 (3d
Cir. 1964); af'd, 383 U.S. 463 (1965); Meyer v. Austin; 319 F. Supp. 457 (M.D. Fla.
1970), vacated, 413 U.S. 905 (1972); Grove Press, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 300 F. Supp.
281 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. 392 Copies
of a Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 253 F. Supp. 485 (D. Md. 1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d
633 (1967); United States v. One Carton Positive Motion Picture Film Entitled
"491", 247 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), rev'd 367 F.2d 889 (1966).
The First Circuit chose a national standard prior to Jacobellis.Excellent Publications, Inc. v. United States, 309 F.2d 362 (1st Cir. 1962); Flying Eagle Publica22

21
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these lower court opinions recognized the lack of definitive authority and independently analyzed the competing constitutional considerations, most felt that Jacobellis mandated national standards-a view that is hardly justified by the opinions in that case. 3
As a result, national standards became the law of the land and so
remained until 1973.
In 1973, the Supreme Court finally dealt with the issue in such
a way as to give some clear guidance to lower courts. Unlike the
previous cases, where the issue of whether national or local standards were to be applied was, at best, a collateral matter, that
24
issue was central to the decision in Miller v. California.
Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, held in Miller that it was
not error to instruct the jury to apply "contemporary community
standards of the State of California." 25 Burger's reasoning in Miller
tion, Inc. v. United States 273 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1960).
The state courts were divided. Those that employed a national standard include: State v. Locks, 97 Ariz. 148, 397 P.2d 949 (1964); State v. Lewitt, 3 Conn.
Cir. 605, 222 A.2d 579 (App. Div. Cir. Ct. 1966); State v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 50 (Mo.
1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 895 (1968); State v. Hudson County News Co., 41 N.J.
247, 196 A.2d 225 (1963); People v. Stabile, 58 Misc.2d 905, 296 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Crim.
Ct. 1969); State v. Childs, 252 Ore. 91, 447 P.2d 304 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
931 (1968); Robert Arthur Management Corp. v. State, 220 Tenn. 101, 414 S.W.2d
638, rev'd, 389 U.S. 578 (1967). Those adopting a statewide or smaller community
were: In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, cert. denied,
395 U.S. 910 (1968); Carter v. State, 388 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. 1965); McCauley
v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963); People v. Bloss, 27
Mich. App. 687, 184 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1970), vacated, 413 U.S. 909 (1972);
Gent v. State, 239 Ark. 474, 393 S.W.2d 219 (1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 767 (1966);
Felton v. Pensacola, 200 So. 2d 842 (Fla.) rev'd, 390 U.S. 340 (1967). These latter
cases, although predating Miller, can still be considered valid authority in their
respective states and should be consulted in those states for the light they may shed
on the definition or boundaries of the local community.
The leading articles on contemporary community standards prior to the Miller
case are: Lockhart & McClure, Censorshipof Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards,45 MmN. L. REv. 5, 108-12 (1960); O'Meara & Shaffer, Obscenity
in the Supreme Court:A Note on Jacobellis v. Ohio, 40 NOTE DAME LAW. 1, 6-7
(1964); Note, The Geography of Obscenity's Contemporary Community Standard,
8 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 81 (1971); Comment, Multi-Venue and the Obscenity
Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 399 (1967); Port, Standards of Judging ObscenityWho? What? Where? 46 CHI. B. REC. 405 (1965); Comment, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 691;
Comment, 16 S.C.L. REv. 639 (1964).
2 Of the cases cited in note 22, it is generally the state cases that have the more
reasoned opinions.
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
2 Id. at 30-34. Discussions of the community standards concept that post-date
Miller, and, therefore, analyze the issue in terms of the local standard formulation,
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is built upon the premise, first made by Chief Justice Warren in
Jacobellis, that a national standard is non-existent or, at best, is
not capable of determination. Although the majority in Miller accepted the view that "fundamental First Amendment limitations"
must be uniform, this same majority did not agree that this concept required the essentially factual determination of contemporary community standards also be uniform:
These are essentially questions of fact, and our nation is simply
too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that
such standards could be articulated for all 50 states in a single
formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists.
When triers of fact are asked to decide whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would
consider certain materials "prurient," it would be unrealistic to
require that the answer be based on some abstract formulation.
The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate
factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted
triers of fact to draw on the standards of their community,
guided always by limiting instructions on the law. To require a
State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a
national
"community standard" would be an exercise in futil2
ity. 8

Later, the Court went on to note:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City.Y
A national standard, as the Miller court noted, is probably
incapable of identification. Litigation under the national standard
tended to focus on the temporal, rather than the geographic, nature of the concept of contemporary community standards. It can
be argued that the more localized standard set forth by the Miller
court provides a standard that is more ascertainable and, thus,
gives vitality to the geographic aspects of the standard without
detracting from the temporal aspects. Although the period of experience with the Miller formulation has been reasonably brief, it
include: Comment, Obscenity: Determined By Whose Standards, 26 U. FLA. L.
REv. 324 (1974); Comment, Pornography,The Local Option, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 97
(1974); Comment, 8 GA. L. REv. 225 (1973); Comment, 8 VALP A.so L. REv. 166
(1973).

413 U.S. at 30.
Id. at 32.
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appears that Miller may add a test that did not in fact exist under
the national standards formulation." This increase in significance
of the contemporary community standards test makes it much
more important that courts properly determine and apply the
standard of the appropriatecommunity.
Miller was, of course, a review of a state court prosecution and,
thus, did not clearly face the issue of the application of the local
standards formulation to federal prosecutions under the various
federal statutes dealing with obscenity." However, two companion
cases to Miller signaled the demise of the national standards concept in federal, as well as state, prosecutions. In United States v.
Twleve 200 ft. Reels"5 and United States v. Orito,"1 the Court said
that the Miller standards were applicable to federal prosecutions.
Since the Miller standards embodied the local standards concept,
there seemed a fairly clear inference that local community standards were to be applied in federal prosecutions. Since the major
justification for the change to local standards was the elusive nature of national standards, it seemed unlikely that standards that
were unascertainable or unworkable in state prosecutions would
magically become ascertainable and workable when the location of
32
the trial shifted to the federal courthouse.
The issue was resolved a year later in Hamling v. United
21Evidence in obscenity cases prior to Miller tended to focus on the nowdiscarded "utterly without redeeming social value" test of Memoirs v.
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). Evidence at obscenity trials since Miller
has been oriented primarily towards the community standards test.
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (Supp. 1975) prohibits the mailing of obscene matter; 18
U.S.C. § 1462 (Supp. 1975) prohibits the importation of obscene matter and the
use of a common carrier for carriage in interstate or foreign commerce of obscene
matter; 18 U.S.C. § 1463 (Supp. 1975) prohibits the mailing of obscene or indecent
matter on wrappers or envelopes; 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1966) prohibits the broadcasting
of obscene language; 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1966) prohibits the transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of obscene matter for the purpose of sale or distribution;
19 U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. 1975) provides for the seizure of obscene material by
customs authorities, and 39 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3011 (Supp. 1975) deals with nonmailable matter, including obscene matter.
413 U.S. 123, 130 (1973).
3- 413 U.S. 139, 145 (1973).
Despite this, at least one federal court continued to follow the national
standards concept after Miller, relying on ManualEnterprisesand Jacobellis to say
that such a significant change in federal law would have to be more explicit before
those cases could be ignored. United States v. One Reel of Film, 481 F.2d 206, 210
(1st Cir. 1973) (Coffin, J., concurring); United States v. Palladino, 490 F.2d 499,
502-503 (1st Cir. 1974).
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States.3 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the same members of the
Court who made up the Miller majority, said that the concept of
local community standards was equally applicable to federal prosecutions. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that when Orito and Twelve
200 ft. Reels said that the Miller standards were applicable to
federal prosecutions, the Miller definition of contemporary community standards was included. 31 It is, of course, in the area of
federal prosecutions that the choice of law issue becomes most
significant, because, except for those cases involving the mails
under 18 U.S.C. § 1461, the jurisdictional basis for federal power
necessarily involves more than one state and, therefore, more than
one potentially applicable local standard.
In Miller, the Supreme Court approved the instructions of a
California trial judge who had instructed the jury to apply the
community standards of California.3 The Court did not indicate
418 U.S. 87 (1974).
31Id. at 103-10.

1 413 U.S. at 31. There is, of course, the question of just what is to be measured
in terms of contemporary community standards. When the community standards
test first appeared in Roth, it was part of the test that material is to be judged
obscene according to "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to prurient interest." 354 U.S. at 489. Thus, the purpose of community standards
was to provide a frame of reference by which the prurient interest of the material
could be measured. Because what is prurient in one time and place may not be
prurient in another, the community standards test was designed to add focus to this
determination. The first section of the Miller test is a restatement of the original
Roth test, and thus there is no question that contemporary community standards
still provide the guideline for determining whether or not material appeals to the
prurient interest. The second part of the Miller test is "whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law." 413 U.S. at 24.
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 38 U.S. 413 (1966), related the patently offensive
test to the concept of community local standards by defining obscene material as
that which "is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters." Id. at
418. Since the patently offensive part of the Memoirs test was neither rejected nor
criticized in Miller, and since the Miller court discussed the failings of the national
standards test in terms of both the prurient interest and patent offensiveness standards (413 U.S. at 30), it is reasonable to conclude that local community standards
apply also to the patent offensiveness requirement. United States v. B & H Dist.
Corp., 375 F. Supp. 136, 141 (W.D. Wis. 1974). Offensiveness is certainly as susceptible to geographic variations as prurient interest, and since a work is not obscene
unless if offends the community's standards, both prurient interest and patent
offensiveness must be evaluated in light of the redefined contemporary community
standards. However, since the Court has never referred to the "literary, artistic,
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directly whether a local community instruction was in fact re-

quired, nor did it give any indication of whether local standards
drawn from a geographical area narrower than an entire state
would also be acceptable. The opinion said nothing at all about the
size or definition of the community that was to provide the basis
for the local contemporary community standards. The Court did,
however, express enough negative views about national standards
to indicate that a national standard in a particular case would be
unacceptable,"6 and a year later the Court said further that a national community standard was no longer permissableY
The question still persists regarding the size of the local community. In trials under state law, the trial can be conducted under
the community standards of the entire state, as was done in Miller,
even in the absence of any state law defining community standards. In the absence of a state law, the jury could be instructed
to apply the standards of the county, the city, the judical district
in which the trial occurs, or any other appropriate geographical
area. There are, of course, competing factors of workability on the
one hand and first amendment values on the other hand involved
in selecting the size of the community. The factor of workability,
which was the basis of Miller, will most often militate in favor of
a narrow area, especially where the entire state encompasses either
a large or a diverse community. Certainly the community standards of a small town in upstate New York are no more similar to
the standards of New York City than the standards of Maine are
similar to the standards of Las Vegas, to use the Supreme Court's
example in Miller." For a state like New York, California, or
political, or scientific value" aspect of the test (413 U.S. at 24) as varying from
community to community, and since this is much less a question of fact than it is
a matter of constitutional law, this third part of the Miller test is not subject to
the community standards factor. This is the part of the test that embodies the
essentials of first amendment theory, the principle that any expression of ideas is
within the scope of first amendment protection, and geographic variations in basic
first amendment values are not considered acceptable. See Miller v. California, 413
U.S. at 30.
34See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
37 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974). But the majority did not
feel that instructions as to the wrong standards required reversal of a conviction
where no specific harm or prejudice could be shown. Id. at 110.
1 413 U.S. at 32. Similarly, there may be no reason to believe that the standards, for instance, of adjacent and similar areas such as Westchester County, New
York, and Fairfield County, Connecticut, would be different merely because a state
line intervenes.
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Texas, a statewide standard is little more ascertainable than a
national standard. Yet if the area chosen is too small, there may
be a chilling effect on the distribution of generally accepted materials if a distributor or seller must deal with too many different
community standards. These competing considerations have led
some to believe that this should be a legislative determination; a
number of legislatures have specifically defined the community in
the wake of Miller."
Another approach is to ignore any specific instructions to the
jury concerning how the community is defined or to instruct the
jury to call upon their own experience and knowledge in assessing
the standards of the community. The size of the community then
is theoretically the area from which the jury is drawn, but there is
nothing to prevent jurors with wider or narrower perceptions from
implicitly adopting a different community. The Supreme Court
specifically approved such instructions in Hamling v. United
States,0 a federal prosecution, and although some federal courts
have still utilized a specific and narrow definition of community,
the Hamling approach will probably be followed in many federal
cases.4'
Jury instructions in obscenity cases are very often determinative of the outcome, and the community standards phase of the
instructions is that which is often most clear in the jury's mind.
Therefore, defining the community in the instructions becomes
extremely important. Furthermore, evidence in obscenity cases is
In McJunkins v. State, 10 Ind. 140 (1858), the defendant had been convicted
of public indecency for using obscene language and singing obscene songs. In reversing the conviction on the grounds that the use of obscene language was not within
the intent of the statute, the Supreme Court of Indiana noted as a potential problem the varying concepts of indecency. "Is the public sentiment of each locality to
be reflected through the jury?" 10 Ind. at 146.
31 See, e.g., CONN. GEN.STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-193(a) (amended by P.A. 74-126);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 272 § 31 (amended by ch. 430, Acts of 1974); N.C. GEN.STAT.
§ 14-190.1(b)(2) (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE § 39-3010(G) (Supp. 1974); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit.13 § 2801(B) (Supp. 1974). All of the foregoing define the community as
being the state. Illinois and Montana do not define community but provide that

acceptance of the material in the state is relevant evidence. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 11-20 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974); MONT.REv. CODES ANN. § 94-8-110(3) (Supp.
1974).
40418 U.S. 87, 104-05. (1974). See United States v. Cangianio, 491 F.2d 906,
914 (2d Cir. 1974).

41The only reported case is United States v. One Reel of 35 mm Color Motion
Picture Film Entitled "Sinderella," 491 F.2d 956, 958 (2d Cir. 1974) (court, sitting
without jury, applied standards of Eastern District of New York).
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often oriented toward proof of community standards. Whether
such proof is offered by expert testimony,42 by comparable materials,43 by surveys,44 or by other means,45 the proper definition of the
community becomes crucial in the qualification of witnesses and
in the admissibility of evidence. Thus, where several discrete communities are available, the proper choice among them should be
based on a reasonable decision. Since these issues occur most often
in criminal prosecutions," it will be helpful to discuss some of the
general principles of choice of law in criminal cases.
III.

CHOICE OF LAW IN CRIMINAL CASES4"

The choice of applicable law in criminal cases has rarely been
discussed, in large part because choice of law and jurisdictional
power have always been treated as the same question. As Professor
Lefiar points out, choice of law in civil cases is a major issue because most civil actions are "transitory," thus allowing suit to be
brought, as long as there is jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties, in a jurisdiction not necessarily related to the underlying cause of action. Criminal cases, however, are "local" and may
be prosecuted only in the jurisdiction where the crime, or at least
the controlling portion of the crime, in fact occurred. 48 Two major
42 See generally, McGaffey, A Realistic Look at Expert Witnesses in Obscenity
Cases, 69 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 218 (1974). Qualification of an expert witness on the issue
of what the community's standards are may be a difficult task but should be
permitted if the expert's occupation necessarily involves an assessment of community standards, as does that of police officers, ministers, journalists, and, perhaps, public officials. Of course, it would be important if the knowledge of community standards included direct knowledge of the community's standards regarding the depiction of sexual matters.
" United States v. Manarite, 448 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
947 (1971); United States v. Jacobs, 433 F.2d 932, 933 (9th Cir. 1970). Womack v.
United States, 294 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1961); See also Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 125-26 (1974); United States v. One Reel of 35 mm Color
Motion Picture Film Entitled "Sinderella," 491 F.2d 956, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1974). See
generally 76 HARv. L. REv. 1498; Comment, 12 DE PAUL L. Rav. 337 (1963).
" Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 n.12 (1973); Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 108 n.10 (1974). See generally Lamont, Public Opinion Polls and
Survey Evidence in Obscenity Cases, 15 CRns. L.Q. 135 (1973).
For example, in a federal prosecution in state X, it might be relevant to X's
community standards if X had no state obscenity laws.
" But see text accompanying notes 102-04 infra.
" This section is clearly an overview of this area. The most thorough treatment
of the area is found in Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Cases,
25 CASE W. Rag. L. Rav. 44 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Leflar].
I Leflar, supra note 47, at 48.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol77/iss3/2

12

Schauer: Obscenity and the Conflict of Laws

OBSCENITY LAWS
principles underlie this approach to criminal cases. The first is the
constitutional control over the power of the criminal sanction. This
is most often stated in due process terms either from the federal
or a state constitution.49 It may also arise as the result of constitutional provisions concerning jurisdiction or venue of criminal prosecutions"0 or from the full faith and credit,51 equal protection,- or
privileges and immunities" provisions of the Constitution. Whatever theory is used, the result is a significant constitutional limitation on the power of the state to prosecute crimes that are essentially extraterritorial. Secondly, it is generally accepted that
states-or nations-may not enforce the penal laws of other
states.54 Thus, if a crime has no significant relationship with state
A but only with state B, prosecution must be left to state B.
This latter factor is the reason why choice of law, as it is
commonly known, is generally not an issue in criminal cases. Even
those who suggest a more functional or realistic approach to choice
of law in criminal cases have not suggested that, in a criminal
prosecution, state A can prosecute the crime according to the laws
of state B. 55 The decision to be made in the traditional criminal
case is whether or not it would be constitutional, or appropriate,
or both, for state A to apply its criminal law and exercise its criminal enforcement powers to a given set of facts that may or may not
have a sufficient relationship to state A for this to occur.
Thus, it can easily be seen that in a normal criminal case the
answer to the jurisdictional question also answers the choice of law
question. This is unlike the civil area where an affirmative answer
to the jurisdictional question may still leave major conflict of laws
11Id. at 49.

1 See, e.g., U.S. CoNsT. art. El, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 17; Wis. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
51 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. Rav. 449 (1959).
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscriminationin the Conflict of Laws: EqualProtection,28 U. Cin. L. Rav. 1, (1960).
" U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1; see Currie & Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscrimination in the Conflict of Laws; Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323
(1960).
11Leflar, supra note 47, at 56-57; Leflar, ExtrastateEnforcement of Penal and
Govermental Claims, 46 HARv. L. Rav. 193 (1932); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825).
55 "Giving effect to [choice-influencing considerations] in criminal cases
should, if anything, be easier, since the case will not be heard unless it is proposed
to apply the forum's law to it." Leflar, supra note 47, at 61-62 (emphasis added).
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issues. Neither of these models, however, is entirely applicable to
a criminal obscenity prosecution, for reasons that will be shown,
and thus the need for a separate choice of law analysis for the
obscenity area seems desirable.
IV.

CHOICE OF STANDARDS IN OBSCENITY CASES

There are circumstances when an obscenity prosecution will
present traditional choice of law issues of the type described in the
previous section of this article. For example, if a defendant ships
obscene materials from Pennsylvania for exhibition or sale in West
Virginia, a question may present itself as to whether this individual could be prosecuted under the Pennsylvania obscenity statute.
The determination of this issue may depend on the operative words
of the Pennsylvania statute under which the prosecution is
brought. If the offense is publication, then an analogy to the law
of criminal libel may be used and the offense may be prosecuted
only where the publication occurs, which in this case would be
West Virginia. 6 If, however, the offense is shipment, distribution,
or possession, the act may properly be prosecuted in Pennsylvania.
This is because of the traditional choice of law theory in criminal
cases that focuses on the operative word of the crime and allows
prosecution only in the jurisdiction where the event described by
the operative word occurred.57 If the crime is defined as "selling,"
"delivering," or "offering" obscene materials, then the jurisdiction
of prosecution, and the law to be applied, is the locus where the
actual sale, delivery, or offer occurred. 8 This approach is best exemplified by the case law concerning venue of prosecution under
18 U.S.C. § 1461, 51which makes a federal crime of mailing obscene
58

Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304 (1825).

" Leflar, supra note 47, at 54-55.
Cf. Harper v. State, 91 Ark. 422, 121 S.W. 737 (1909).
Whoever knowingly uses the mails for the mailing, carriage in the
mails, or delivery of anything declared by this section or section 3001(e)
of title 39 to be nonmailable, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail
according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed
to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, or knowingly takes
any such thing from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing
thereof, or of aiding in the circulation thereof, shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, for the first
such offense, and shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both, for each such offense thereafter.
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970).
"
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matter. Prior to the 1958 amendment of the statute, " the statute
defined the crime as the deposit into the mails of obscene matter. 1
The cases interpreting this provision, when faced with a dispute
concerning the place of prosecution, held that the crime so defined
could be prosecuted only in the district where the materials were
actually put in the mail box or delivered to the post office and not
in the district where the materials were received.62 However, in
1958 the statute was amended to define the crime as the use of the
mails, rather than the deposit into the mails. Thus, by changing
the "movement verb," 63 Congress redefined the offense to be a
continuing offense." Therefore, those federal courts that have dealt
with the issue after the 1958 amendment have uniformly held that
a defendant charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461 may be
prosecuted in the district of mailing, the district of receipt, or any
district through which the material passes. 5 Courts could reach
similar judicial interpretations of those statutes involving the
transportation" and perhaps the distribution of obscene materials,

and could conclude that these crimes, too, may be continuing
11Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-796, § 1, 72 Stat. 962, amending 18
U.S.C. § 1461 (1948).
11Although 18 U.S.C. § 1461 was originally enacted in 1948, it is a derivation
of a much earlier statute. See Swearingen v. United States, 161 U.S. 446 (1896).
The statute is often called the "Comstock Act" after Anthony Comstock, the 19th
century leader of the Vice Societies who brought about its adoption.
62 United States v. Ross, 205 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1953); United States v. Comerford, 25 F. 902 (W.D. Tex. 1885).
91Abrams, Conspiracy and Multi-Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions:
The Crime Committed Formula,9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 751, 791 (1962). See Comment,
Multi-Venue and the Obscenity Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 401 (1967), which
contains a very thorough discussion of the continuing offense concept as it relates
to the obscenity laws.
6" 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1969) provides, in part, that "any offense involving the use
of the mails, or transportation in interstate or foreign commerce, is a continuing
offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment by Congress, may
be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such
commerce or mail matters moves."
The constitutionality of the 1958 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1461 has been
upheld. Reed Enterprises v. Clark, 278 F. Supp. 372 (D.D.C. 1967) (three judge
court), afl'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 457 (1968).
65United States v. Levy, 331 F. Supp. 712 (D. Conn. 1971); United States v.
Sidelko, 248 F. Supp. 813. (M.D. Pa. 1965) (but holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1461
(1970) does not expose to liability thereunder those who order and receive obscene
material for personal use); United States v. Luros, 243 F. Supp. 160, 176 (N.D.
Iowa); cert. denied, 382 U.S. 956 (1965).
16See note 64 supra. But see Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S.
56 (1908).
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offenses and may also be prosecuted in any district through which
the material passes.
The selection of the appropriate venue for an obscenity prosecution involves substantial constitutional considerations not necessarily related to obscenity laws. The sixth amendment provides
that prosecution of all federal crimes must be brought in the district where the crime was committed. 7 In addition, the due process
clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments has been held to
incorporate, within the concept of fundamental fairness, the idea
that the place of trial must bear some reasonable relationship to
the locus of the crime." All of these constitutional provisions incorporate a policy decision in favor of reasonably restrictive venue
provisions and, therefore, mandate strict constuction of
congressional action defining an offense as a continuing one.6" In
cases involving the mailing or transportation of obscene materials,
it is likely that the continuing offense definition could result in
venue being fixed in a jurisdiction that has no substantial connection with the act and that a defendant might not have been able
to reasonably foresee. In part, this danger has been minimized by
general reluctance on the part of federal prosecutors to bring actions in these "intermediate" districts. The primary effect of the
continuing offense theory has been to allow prosecutions at the
place of delivery, thus avoiding the above difficulties.
It is obvious that these problems of venue are magnified in the
context of federal prosecutions involving multi-state transactions.
Many of the same issues can arise, however, in the context of a
state prosecution. Most states have venue provisions regarding
criminal cases that also require the defendant to be tried in the
district where the crime occurred.71 Such state venue provisions are
generally based upon the same constitutional considerations that
11"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained
by law,. . ." U.S. CONsT. amend VI; see also U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 3.
" See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Leflar, supra note 47, at 4849.
62 See United v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275 (1944).
10The legislative history of the 1958 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1461 shows that
the Post Office Department assured Congress that it did not intend to press for
prosecutions in intermediate districts. H.R. REP. No. 2624, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1958). The absence of cases indicates that this assurance has generally been followed.
1' See, e.g., ARIz. Rav. STAT. § 13-161 (1956); N.J. STAT. § 2A: 3-4 (1952),
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apply to federal criminal prosecutions. These same considerations
may also apply to the election by a state to take jurisdiction of a
crime involving more than one state. Since most obscenity offenses
involve acts that span large areas, such as transportation, distribution, sale, and the like, elective jurisdiction is a continuing problem in obscenity law. In obscenity law, however, unlike many other
areas, the selection of venue is likely to determine the outcome of
the litigation, and, therefore, the analysis of proper venue becomes
of crucial concern.
Prior to the Miller case, the selection of venue and choice of
law in obscenity cases was of significantly less concern than it is
now. Under the national standards concept, 72 the test for obscenity
was theoretically uniform throughout the nation, both in state and
federal prosecutions. While it is true that the elements of the
particular offense varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the
fundamental question as to whether the materials involved were
or were not obscene was formulated identically in all cases. Thus,
in a particular case, the trier of fact was expected to put aside both
his own beliefs and his perception of the beliefs of his own community and rely on the evidence presented regarding the standards
of the nation. It is not surprising, in this context, that some courts
felt that producing some evidence of the national standard was an
essential element of the prosecution's burden of proof.7" Yet even
with the assistance of this evidence, it is questionable whether the
jury can in fact put aside personal predilections and perceptions
and rely only on the national standard. It may be, as Justice Black
observed in Ginzburg v. United States,74 that the "guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with obscenity must depend in the
final analysis upon the personal judgment and attitudes of particular individuals and the place where the trial is held. ' 7 Even
though the locus of the trial may have had an effect on the verdict,
neither the instructions nor the admissibility of evidence would
vary under application of the national standard, and thus true
conflicts of laws issues did not arise under the national standard
cases.
72See text accompanying notes 6-23 supra.

71 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Id. at 171 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), United
States v. Kaw, 350 F.2d 155, 160 (2d Cir. 1965); Comment, 76 HAv. L. REV. 1498
(1963); contra, Kahm v. United States, 300 F.2d 78 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
859 (1962).
74 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
11Id. at 480 (Black, J., dissenting).
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With the change to local standards, however, the issue takes
on a new importance. The community standards element of the
test for obscenity is not necessarily a substantive element of the
offense, thus the question of jurisdiction over the offense does not
necessarily determine which community's standard applies." If
materials are shipped from New York to California, and the defendant is tried in New York, there is no inherent bar in traditional
choice of law terms to preclude utilizing the community standards
of California to determine whether or not the materials are obscene. If a prosecution for mailing obscene materials under 18
U.S.C. § 1461 is brought in an intermediate district, application
of the community standards of the place of mailing or the intended
destination would not offend traditional choice of law theory. Since
selection of the relevant community is now at issue and since the
admissibility of evidence and the instructions to the jury depend
on this selection, some rational method of making this choice must
be formulated.
One often attempted method of proving that a work is not
obscene is to show, by the use of comparable materials, that the
work is no more offensive than other materials that are both available and accepted by the community." Therefore, the admissibility of these materials will depend on which community is chosen.
Similarly, the prosecution or the defense may wish to introduce a
survey of the views of the community on obscene material generally or on the particular material at issue.78 The results of this
survey, and its admissibility, will clearly depend upon selection of
the relevant community. The same problem arises where a party
to litigation wishes to use expert testimony regarding the nature
of the standards of the community.7" Only if the expert is familiar
with the standards of the appropriate community will his testimony be relevant and admissible. Of course, the instructions to the
jury will also depend on which community is chosen. Thus, a
choice that reflects all the appropriate considerations is especially
important here since so many issues at trial will turn on this
choice.
The simplest solution, and the one that has been followed by
"' But see section III of this article.
71 See note 43 supra.

" See note 44 supra.
11 See note 42 supra.
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those lower courts that have faced the problem,"0 is to apply the
community standards of the forum of the prosecution. It is perhaps
reasonable to assume that regardless of the evidence presented,
and regardless of the instructions, a jury will inevitably apply the
standards of the community with which they -are most familiar."
Thus, applying the standards of the forum limits the possibility
that both the evidence and the instructions will be ignored. Practical problems also arise when evidence of a standard other than that
of the forum is used. Witnesses must be brought from other areas
to enable the prosecution to present evidence of the distant community's standards. This evidence probably must appear in the
prosecutor's case-in-chief, despite the holding of the Supreme
Court that prosecution evidence of community standards is not
normally required.82 In fact, it can be argued that by eliminating
the requirement that the prosecution present evidence on this issue
the Court indicated that it, too, believed that the standards of the
forum will prevail in all prosecutions regardless of the evidence or
the law. In Hamling v. United States," however, the Court declared that it might be proper under certain circumstances to
"admit evidence of standards in some place outside of this particular district."I It is impossible to tell whether the Court in Hamling
meant a larger area that includes the district, a different area not
including the district, or both. But the recognition by the Court
that the jury can receive and appreciate evidence of community
standards other than those of which the jury is familiar further
indicates that a close look at the standards to be chosen in a given
case is required.
The most significant difficulty with merely applying the standards of the forum is that it can lead to the most extreme examples
of forum-shopping by the prosecution. 5 The question of guilt or
innocence should not, and does not normally, turn on the law
where the prosecution occurs, but this is the inevitable result when
0 United States v. One Reel of 35 mm Color Motion Picture Film Entitled
"Sinderella," 491 F.2d 956, 958 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Friedman, 488 F.2d
1141, 1142 (10th Cir. 1973).
81The Supreme Court has recognized that instructions to the jury cannot
always correct previous impressions. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
418 U.S. 87 (1974).

Id. at 106.
See S. REP. No. 1839, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958). The Senate originally
opposed inclusion of the "intermediate" district in the revision of 18 U.S.C. § 1461.
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a major substantive element of the offense,"0 by definition, varies
from place to place. The dangers of selective prosecution become
even greater in situations, such as an obscenity case, where the
place of prosecution defines the offense charged. In a prosecution
under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 for sending obscene matter through the
mails, the prosecution could, as has previously been explained,"?
be brought at the place of mailing, the place of delivery, or any
place through which the package passes. If the standards of the
community are in fact different in each state, which seems a reasonable assumption," a putative defendant may run the risk of
prosecution under standards that he has no logical reason to believe will be employed. Nor can he, with assurance, plan his activities in such a way as to avoid those areas where such activities are
illegal. This apprehension of violation of unforseeable law creates
a substantial danger of a chilling effect on the distribution of material that is in fact constitutionally protected. But what of its effect
on distribution of material that would be questionable but not
necessarily legally obscene? It is very conceivable that sellers
might not risk the variability of different standards, or assume the
burden of knowing a large number of different standards, especially where there is uncertainty about which of those standards
is applicable.89 Thus, the availability of tangentially related, but
substantially irrelevant, standards could likely prevent the distribution of works to or in those communities where those works are
in fact acceptable. To the extent that the shift to local standards
may involve this type of chilling effect, uncertainty regarding
which community's standards will be applied increases the danger
of such a chilling effect.
Since the issue has yet to be squarely faced by any court, a
suggested analysis seems appropriate. In actuality, this is a conflict of laws problem, because the effect of a geographic variation
in the substantive standards for criminality under the same statute is analytically indistinguishable from that of the application
of conflicting statutes. Traditional choice of law in criminal law
u It is a substantive element of the offense because virtually all obscenity

statutes prohibit the transportation, distribution, or mailing of obscene material
only, and according to Roth and Miller, matter is not obscene unless it offends some
community's standards.
"

See text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
See Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15, 30-32 (1973).

"

See Comment, Multi-Venue and the Obscenity Statutes, 115 U.PA. L. Rv.

399, 403, 425(1967).
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has already been discussed; in criminal cases the choice of law
decision has been more localized than in civil litigation. Thus, the
fact that obscenity litigation involves criminal penalties probably
explains those obscenity decisions that have used, without discussion, the standards of the forum. But deference to the law of the
forum inevitably ignores some of the first amendment and due
process considerations discussed which are especially relevant to
obscenity law. A possible solution, or at least a preferable method
of analysis, may lie with the adoption of some of the more modem
theories of choice of law applied to civil cases. 0 Since jurisdiction
is not a problem in the issue under discussion, there is no reason
why a method of analysis used in civil cases cannot be appropriate
here.
One possible alternative might be the application in obscenity
cases of the "center of contacts" or "groupings of contacts" theory,
employed most notably in the New York Court of Appeals decision
of Babcock v. Jackson.91 This theory applies the law of the jurisdiction that has the largest number or most significant contacts with
the alleged wrongful act or the cause of action.2 Under the center
of contacts theory a jurisdiction only tangentially related to the
essence of the litigation, such as a jurisdiction which is merely the
place of an accident or the place of the signing of a contract,93 may
not have sufficient relevance to the entire transaction to justify the
application of its law to the case. This approach, in an obscenity
case, would require an examination of all potential geographic contacts, including the place of prosecution, the place of origin, the
place of destination, the residence of the expected readers or viewers, the place where the material was created, and other similar
factors. Upon an examination of all of these, the standards of the
community having the most significant contacts would be selected
as the community against whose standards the material is measured to determine whether the material is obscene by contemporary community standards. This approach would certainly prevent
See generallyLeflar, The "New" Choice of Law, 21 Am. U.L. Rnv. 457 (1972);
A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTAN, THE LAW OF MUTI-STATE PROBLEMS (1965). Strict

territoriality in choice of law has been almost universally discarded. Clark v. Clark,
107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
0112 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
92See, e.g., Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954); cf. Lauritzen
v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. Internation Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354 (1959); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372
U.S. 10 (1963); REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFIucr OF LAws § 145, 188 (1971).
13Assuming, of course, that there was no other connection with this locality.
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the application of the standards of a community only incidentally
involved, such as a community whose only connection with the
transaction is its position on a mail or bus route by which the
material is transported; for that reason alone it seems clearly preferable to the approaches. now being used.
An even better alternative would be the application of a functional choice-of-law theory in obscenity litigation. This approach
weighs all of the interests that may be involved, such as the interest in predictability of results, the interest in orderly administration of justice between states, the particular govermental interests
of the forum, and similar factors, before selection of the law to be
applied is made. 4 All of these factors may be relevant in a particular obscenity case, and each must be analyzed before the choice is
made of the appropriate community in each case." The most significant factor in this approach, however, is that of looking to the
purpose of the law involved before making the decision regarding
the law to be applied." The primary purpose of most obscenity
laws is to protect the "target" community, the community where
the material is actually available to the public and the purpose of
the community standards test is to allow that community to govern what materials will or will not be available. 7 In order to best
serve this purpose the standards of the target community or the
point of ultimate availability or exhibition of the material would
become the relevant community. In other words, the relevant community under this approach is that one in which the materials
come into contact with the group that the appropriate statute is
designed to protect from obscene materials. This approach also has
the advantage of fair notice and predictability, since it can in most
cases be presumed that a distributor or sender will generally know
the object of his actions. If material is sent through the mail, the
route of the package, and perhaps even the place of mailing, are

1RESTATEMNrr (SEcoND) OF CONFucr OF LAWS § 6 (1971); A. VON MEIHREN &
D. TRAUTMM, Tm LAw OF MULTI-STATE PROBLEIS 76-79 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as VON MEHMI & TRAuTMAN]; R. LEFLAR, AmEmcAN CONFrs LAw § 105 (1968);
Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Brown v. Church of Holy Name
of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 252 A.2d 176 (1969); Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis.
2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973).
'" Since we are concerned with a conflict of relatively subjective standards
rather than a conflict of laws as such, some of the choice-influencing considerations,
such as maintenance of interstate order and application of the better rule of law,
are less significant than they would be in the normal choice of law situation.
" VON MEHREN & TRAuTMAN, supra note 94, at 76-79, 102-17.
" See Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973).
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somewhat fortuitous, but the package must always have an intended destination. Of course, the purpose of the statute may be
somewhat different. If the statute seems designed to prevent a
certain locality from being the place of production of obscene materials, then that community's standards would seem most relevant even if prosecution is instituted elsewhere. If the purpose of
the law is to keep material from the "stream of commerce,"98 then
there would seem ample justification for employing the community standards of some intermediate point.9
These problems become even more difficult where conspiracy
is alleged. It may be that a prosecution in Mississippi alleges that
A,B, C, and D conspired to distribute obscene materials. D himself,
may in fact have only distributed the materials in Oregon. It is
clear that, under established law, venue is proper in Mississippi if
any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred there. ' Yet
the problems of holding the Oregon distributor to the community
standards of Mississippi are apparent. Of course, it can be argued
that one entering into a conspiracy should be responsible for the
community standards of all communities relevant to the conspiracy, just as in a conventional conspiracy prosecution each coconspirator is responsible for all acts of other conspirators within
the scope of the conspiracy. ' Nevertheless, the scope of the conspiracy may not be determined until the trial and may be a matter
for determination by jury. At this point, it could be too late for
presentation of evidence regarding the standards of the ultimately
relevant community or the jury might be forced to apply alternate
community standards depending on the resolution of the conspiracy issues. Thus it might be appropriate for each conspirator to be
judged on the basis of whether or not his actions offended the
community standards of the community that is most appropriate
to those actions. This too would require evidence of multiple community standards, but at least such standards would not be presented in the alternative. Each standard proved would be clearly
11See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903); Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470 (1917); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
11The logical inference to drawn from the "stream of commerce" theory is that
the harm is as great at an intermediate point as at either end.
"I Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912); United States v. Strickland, 493
F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Patrisso, 262 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1958);
McDonough v. United States, 227 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1955).
10,
R.PERmNs, CpanuNAL LAw 632 (2d ed. 1969); Deli Paoli v. United States,
352 U.S. 232 (1957); People v. Lyon, 135 Cal. App. 2d 558, 575, 288 P.2d 57, 68
(1955).
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applicable to a particular defendant. The first amendment problems of holding a defendant to the standards of a community that
are not relevant to his actions are apparent, and thus this approach
may be a preferable approach.
Finally, it should be noted that not all obscenity cases are
criminal prosecutions. There may be proceedings involving seizures,' or injunctions against distribution or exhibition,'' or licensing.' 4 Yet since the suggested analysis is independent of the
factors peculiar to a criminal prosecution, there is no reason why
the analysis would not be equally applicable to civil proceedings.
V.

CONCLUSION

The approach advocated by this article is, of course, based on
the assumption that the trier of fact can apply the standards of a
community other than his own. The Supreme Court has indicated
its acceptance of this assumption,'0 ' and there seems no reason why
a properly instructed jury could not also apply the standards of a
community other than its own. If this assumption is proved erroneous, however, it may become inevitable that the only standards
applied are those of the forum community. If this happens, it may
be that a complete rethinking of the entire community standards
concept would be required.
The suggested analysis is not so much an argument advocating the adoption of a particular approach as it is the suggestion
that in this area all of the best thinking in the conflict of laws field
should be used. A complete analysis of all modem choice of law
thinking is beyond the scope of this discussion. 08 The major premise here is that in choosing the relevant community in an obscenity
case, the courts should not feel bound to historic notions of choice
of law in criminal cases that are not particulary relevant to the
choice of a community in an obscenity case.
"I2As,

for example, under 19 U.S.C. § 1305. See Comment, 13 COLUM. J.

TRANSNAT'L L.

'0

114 (1974).

Obscene exhibitions have been enjoined as nuisances. See 5 U. TOLEDo L.

Rzv. 171 (1973); 49 IND. L.J. 320 (1974).
I'

Most licensing schemes in the obscenity area, however, involve substantial

prior restraint problems. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
"I Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 106.
'10 The authorities cited in note 94 supra represent a more complete picture.
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